

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NEAE-00 SS-15 SSO-00 SP-02 PM-05
NSCE-00 INR-10 INRE-00 CIAE-00 /043 W
-----099072 151715Z /50

O 151555Z AUG 78
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3021
INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SANA IMMEDIATE
CHUSMTM DAHAHRAN
USMTM/DCR/RIYADH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 JIDDA 5960

SECDEF FOR ASD:ISA/DSAA

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, YE, SA, US
SUBJECT: SUPPORT FOR YAR

REF: JIDDA 5939

1. SUMMARY: PRINCE SUAD TOLD ME THAT KING KHALID IS PREPARING
LETTER TO PRESIDENT CARTER SPECIFYING SAG'S VIEW OF MINIMUM
PROGRAM OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE NEEDED BY YAR. WE PROMISED
TO FORWARD IT AS SOON AS RECEIVED. END SUMMARY:

2. I MET ON AUGUST 15 WITH FONMIN PRINCE SAUD. MEETING
WAS ALSO ATTENDED BY PRINCE TURKI BIN FAISAL, POL CONSELOR AND
ECONOFF. PRINCE SAUD SAID THAT WE WOULD BE RECEIVING SHORTLY
A LETTER FROM KING KHALID TO THE PRESIDENT CONCERNING MILITARY
ASSISTANCE FOR THE YAR. HE SAID THAT HE WANTED TO ALERT
ME AS TO THE CONTENTS OF THE LETTER. SAG FEELS THAT IT IS
IMPORTANT TO MAKE A COMMITMENT TO YAR AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
IT WOULD BE A COMMITMENT TO THE STABILITY OF BOTH PENINSULA
AND THE YAR. THE COMMITMENT MUST BE BEYOND WHAT IS USUAL
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BUT NOT BEYOND WHAT IS NECESSARY. IN ANY EVENT, THE
COMMITMENT MUST BE MORE THAN WORDS. IT HAS TO BE MATERIAL.
HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE KING'S LETTER WOULD DEAL IN
SPECIFICS AS TO THE TYPE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE THE SAG
THINKS YAR NEEDS. HE MENTIONED IN PASSING SUCH ITEMS AS
70 TANKS, 12 F-5'S, 100 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS,
2 C-130'S, 3 BATTALIONS OF AA EQUIPMENT, AND TRAINING

FACILITIES FOR THIS EQUIPMENT.

3. PRINE SAUD EMPHASIZED THAT THE EQUIPMENT SPECIFIED IN THE KING'S LETTER WOULD BE THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS THAT SAG SEES AS NECESSARY FOR THE DEFENSE OF YEMEN. THESE PRELIMINARY REQUIREMENTS ARE BASED NOT ONLY ON MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS BUT ALSO ON POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. HE EXPLAINED THAT PRESIDENT SALIH NEEDED TO KEEP HIS MILITARY HAPPY AS WELL AS TO DEFEND YAR. THE MILITARY MUST FEEL THAT THERE IS A REAL COMMITMENT ON THE PART OF THE US TO SUPPORT YAR. YAR HAS LEARNED THE LESSON OF SOMALIA VERY CLEARLY. SOMALIA WAS PROMISED SOMETHING BUT IT WAS NOT GIVEN. A WEAK US COMMITMENT OR AN INSINCERE US COMMITMENT WOULD LEAVE YARG AND PRESIDENT SALIH IN A PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE SITUATION NOT ONLY WITH REGARD TO EXTERNAL SITUATION BUT INTERNAL SITUATION AS WELL.

4. I SAID THAT WE UNDERSTOOD THE THREAT THAT YAR FACES. NSC'S SAMUEL HISKINSON VISITED YAR AND ALSO TALKED TO KEY INDIVIDUALS IN THE SAG. HE BELIEVES THAT THE THREAT TO YAR IS REAL. THE STEPS WHICH WE ARE ABOUT TO TAKE HAVE A PROFOUND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE AND THE YARG SHOULD REALIZE THAT. THAT IS WHY WE SUPPORT THE JOINT PROGRAM FOR US-SAUDI ASSISTANCE TO THE YAR. THIS IS WHAT WE ARE ABLE TO COMMIT OURSELVES AT THE PRESENT TIME. WE CANNOT MAKE FURTHER MATERIAL OR FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS
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WITHOUT GOING TO CONGRESS. AS FAR AS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE GOES, WE WILL BE UNABLE TO DO ANYTHING BEFORE FY 1980, I.E., SOME 13 MONTHS OFF. THE YAR WILL HAVE TO BE PATIENT WITH US WHILE WE GO THROUGH THE PROCESS THAT IS REQUIRED TO MAKE FURTHER COMMITMENTS.

5. PRINCE SAUD SAID THAT THE COMMITMENT TO DO SOMETHING IS THE ESSENTIAL THING. THE MECHANISM OF IMPLEMENTATION CAN BE WORKED OUT LATER. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE NECESSITY FOR GOING TO CONGRESS. HOWEVER, IN THE CASE OF THE F-15'S WHICH ALSO WENT TO CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT MADE A PRIOR COMMITMENT AND THEN PUT IT THROUGH THE CONGRESSIONAL PROCESS. THAT IS WHAT WE NEED HERE. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE ACT QUICKLY; IF WE DO NOT, IT WILL BE TOO LATE.

6. WE SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WE PREPARE OUR CASE CAREFULLY. WE BELIEVE THAT IS NECESSARY TO KEEP COMPLETE THE JOINT THREAT ANALYSIS AND UPDATE THE DEFENSE SURVEY SO THAT WE WILL BE CERTAIN OF WHAT WE ARE DOING. THE LIST OF MILITARY REQUIREMENTS THAT YARG HAS PRESENTED IS TOO AMBITIOUS. WE ARE NOT SURE THAT ALL THE EQUIPMENT

ON THAT LIST IS NEEDED. IT MAY BE THAT SOME EQUIPMENT NOT
ON THE LIST IS NEEDED.

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FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
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7. PRINCE SAUD SAID THAT HE RECOGNIZED THAT THE LIST WAS
TOO LONG AND TOO AMBITIOUS. HE ALSO RECOGNIZED THE
NECESSITY OF COMPLETING THE JOINT THREAT ANALYSIS. THE
REQUIREMENTS IN THE KING'S LETTER ARE BASED ON SAUDI
ARABIA'S INDEPENDENT THREAT ANALYSIS.

8. I EMPHASIZED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR SAUDI ARABIA
AND THE US TO AGREE ON YAR REQUIREMENTS BEFORE GOING
BACK TO YAR WITH AN OFFER. PRINCE SULTAN HAD REQUESTED
THAT WE WORK OUT ALL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US IN PRIVATE
AND THAT WE NOT DISPLAY THESE DIFFERENCES TO YARG.
WE WILL STUDY THE KING'S LETTER CAREFULLY AND WILL CONSULT
WITH THE SAG AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON WHAT WE SHOULD
JOINTLY DO IN YAR.

9. PRINCE SAUD CLOSED THE MEETING WITH THE OBSERVATION
THAT THE DECISIONS MADE IN WASHINGTON ON YAR WILL BE
AS IMPORTANT OR MORE IMPORTANT THAN THOSE AT CAMP DAVID.

10. COMMENT: PRINCE SAUD'S FINAL REMARK ABOUT THE
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IMPORTANCE OF ORDER OF PRIORITIES IN SAUDI FOREIGN POLICY.
SAG BELIEVES THAT ACTION TO FACE THE SOVIET THREAT IS
FIRST PRIORITY. WE WILL FORWARD KING'S LETTER AS SOON
AS RECIEVED, AND RECOMMEND EXPEDITIOUS CONSIDERATION
FO KING'S SUGGESTIONS.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: ARMED FORCES, DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 15 aug 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
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Disposition History: n/a
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Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780333-1024
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Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1739409
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SUPPORT FOR YAR
TAGS: MASS, YE, SA, US, (KHALID, KING)
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/3f0a8663-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
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